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Abstract 
This paper examines real exchange rate (RER) volatility in eighty countries around the 
world, during the period 1970 to 2011. Two main questions are raised: are structural 
breaks in RER volatility related to changes in exchange-rate regimes or financial crises? 
And do these two events affect the permanent and transitory components of RER 
volatility? To answer them, we employ two complementary procedures that consist in 
detecting structural breaks in the RER series and decomposing volatility into its 
permanent and transitory components. Our results suggest that structural breaks in RER 
volatility coincidence with financial crises and certain changes in nominal exchange-
rate regimes. Moreover, our findings confirm that RER volatility does increase with the 
global financial crises and detect that the more flexible the exchange rate regime, the 
higher the volatility of the RER using a de facto exchange rate classification. 
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1. Introduction 
An important challenge to exchange rate theory is the solution to the puzzle that real 
exchange rates (RERs) are more volatile than what most models can account for. 
Moreover, there is a great disagreement in the finance literature about the behaviour of 
nominal exchange rate volatility under alternative exchange rate arrangements. Flood 
and Rose (1995) highlight empirically a positive link between exchange rate volatility 
and flexible exchange rate regimes while Valachy and Kocenda (2003) find either 
positive or negative link according to the countries under investigation. Friedman 
(1953) argues that exchange rate volatility cannot be reduced by switching from floating 
to fixed exchange rates. Lastly, there is a strand of theoretical literature that supports 
that financial integration may reduce exchange rate volatility (see, for example, 
Obstfeld, 1984), although the empirical studies on the effects of globalization on 
exchange rate volatility remain non-conclusive: while Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) 
showed that globalization lead to exchange rate fluctuations, Hau (2002) and Calderón 
(2004) find a positive effect of liberalization on the reduction of the RER volatility. 
Moreover, Dornbusch et al. (1995) and De Gregorio et al. (2000) suggest that 
regardless of exchange regimes; financial integration can make countries vulnerable to 
the external shocks, while Coudert et al. (2011) show that, for most countries in their 
sample, exchange rate volatility increases more than proportionally with the global 
financial crises. This is especially relevant since, from a historical perspective, financial 
crises seem to be more like the rule rather than the exception (see Bordo et al., 2001 and 
Reinhart et al., 2010; among others). 
 
Since RER volatility has important implications for consumption, investment, economic 
growth, and trade flows (see Dellas and Zilberfarb, 1993; Campa and Goldberg, 1995; 
Darby et al., 1999; Frankel and Rose 2002; Broda and Romalis 2013; and Viera et al., 
2013, among others), establishing the relative importance of financial crises and 
exchange-rate regimes on RER volatility is a crucial question. 
 
The majority of the existing literature investigates the effects of exchange rate volatility 
on a number of macroeconomic variables, e.g. growth (Bagella et al., 2006) or trade 
(Baum and Caglayan, 2010). However, there is a lack of sufficient studies examining if 
  
changes in volatility are driven by changes in nominal exchange-rate regimes or 
financial crises.  
 
Regarding previous evidence on this issue we can refer, among others, to Kocenda 
(2005) (who endogenously searches for the single most decisive structural break in 
exchange rate for a group of European transition countries, detecting breaks that are 
frequently associated with major changes in exchange rate regime), Balg and Mecalf 
(2010) (who investigate the impact of the volatility of the underlying macroeconomic 
fundamentals on exchange rate volatility, concluding that  in the long run the volatility 
of the money supply is the sole determinant, whereas in the short run overshooting is 
found), Morales-Zumaquero and Sosvilla-Rivero (2010) (who examine the real 
exchange rate behaviour for a set of 22 OECD and 20 non-OECD countries during the 
1960–2006 period, obtaining that there is clear evidence in favour of the non-neutrality 
of nominal exchange rate regime regarding real exchange rate volatility for developed 
countries, but not in the case of developing or emerging countries), Carrera and Vuletin 
(2013) (who examine a dataset for 63 countries over the period 1946–2007 finding that 
alternative exchange rate regimes affect short-term real exchange rate volatility 
differently), and Caporale et. al (2013) (who find that external, real and monetary 
shocks can account for the volatility of real exchange rates in emerging economies, with 
international financial integration being a major driving force). 
 
This paper attempts to contribute to the empirical literature in this area raising two main 
questions: are structural breaks in RER volatility related to changes in exchange-rate 
regimes or financial crises? And do these two events affect the permanent and transitory 
components of RER volatility? To that end, we use a comprehensive data set including 
developed and developing countries for the 1970-2011 period, to examine whether the 
choice of exchange rate regime and the occurrence of a financial crisis are associated 
with structural breaks in RER volatility and whether they affect its permanent and 
transitory components. 
 
In relation to the relevance of nominal exchange rate regimes and financial crises in 
explaining structural breaks in RER volatility, we use two econometric methods for 
testing for structural breaks: the OLS-based tests to endogenously detect multiple 
structural breaks, as proposed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003), and several procedures 
  
based on Information Criterion together with the so-called sequential procedure 
suggested by Bai and Perron (2003). Once these structural breaks in RER volatility are 
detected, we examine if they are associated with major banking, currency and debt 
crises and whether they coincide with changes in nominal exchange rate regimes. 
 
As for the evaluation of effects of nominal exchange rate regimes and financial crises on 
RER volatility, we use the component GARCH model proposed by Engle and Lee 
(1999) to decompose RER volatility into a permanent long-run trend component and a 
transitory short-run component that is mean-reverting towards the long-run trend.  
 
Our results suggest that structural breaks in RER volatility coincide with financial crises 
and certain changes in nominal exchange-rate regimes. Moreover, our findings confirm 
that exchange rate volatility does increase with the global financial crises and suggest 
that the more flexible the exchange rate regime, the higher the volatility of the RER 
using a de facto exchange rate classification to capture the policies implemented by 
countries regardless of the regime reported by the country’s authorities. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric 
methodology adopted in this study. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical result, 
and Section 4 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Econometric Methodology  
2.1. Structural Breaks 
Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) consider the following multiple linear regression with m 
breaks (m+1 regimes): 
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In this model, ty  is the observed dependent variable at time t; tx  )1( ×p and tz  
)1( ×q are vectors of covariates and β  and jδ  )11( += m,...,j are the vectors of 
coefficients, respectively. Finally, tu  is the disturbance at time t. The break points 
 ),...,( 1 mTT are unknown. The purpose is to estimate the unknown regression coefficients 
and the break points using a sample of T observations. 
  
We consider a pure structural change model )0( =p , where all the coefficients are 
subject to change, from the model in equation (1). In this sense, we specify each series 
as an AR(1) process and then, to detect multiple structural breaks in variance, we use 
the absolute value of the fitted residuals of the AR(1) models1. For this analysis we 
specify { }1=tz .  
 
To detect multiple structural breaks, we use the set of tests developed by Bai and Perron 
(1998, 2003): the sup F type test, the double maximum tests UDmax and WDmax and 
the test for   versus 1+  breaks, labelled sup ( ) 1+TF  test2. To run these tests it is 
necessary to decide the minimum distance between two consecutive breaks, h, that it, is 
obtain as the integer part of a trimming parameter, ε , multiplied by the number of 
observations T (we use 150.ε =  and allow up to four breaks). 
 
To select the dimension of the models, we follow the method suggested by Bai and 
Perron (1998) based on the sequential application of the sup ( ) 1+TF  test, the 
sequential procedure.  
                                                 
1 Similarly, Stock and Watson (2002) use the absolute value of the fitted residuals of a VAR model to 
analyse changes in variance. Alternatively, Valentinyi-Endrész (2004) use the squared errors from a 
AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model to compute changes in variance. 
2 For further analysis see Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). 
  
2.2. Permanent and Transitory Components 
Engle and Lee (1999) proposed a “component-GARCH” (C-GARCH) model to 
decompose time-varying volatility into a permanent (long-run) and a transitory (short-
run) component.  
Consider the original GARCH model: 
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As can be seen, the conditional variance of the returns here has mean reversion to some 
time-invariable value, ω . The influence of a past shock eventually decays to zero as the 
volatility converges to this value ω  according to the powers of (α+β). The standard 
GARCH model therefore makes no distinction between the long-run and short-run 
decay behavior of volatility persistence. 
 
For the permanent specification, the C-GARCH model replaces the time- invariable 
mean reversion value,ω , of the original GARCH formulation in equation (2) with a 
time variable component qt: 
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where, qt  is the long-run time-variable volatility level, which converges to the long-run 
time-invariable volatility level ωˆ  according to the magnitude of ρ. This permanent 
component thus describes the long-run persistence behaviour of the variance. The long-
run time-invariable volatility level ωˆ  can be viewed as the long-run level of returns 
variance for the relevant sector when past errors no longer influence future variance in 
  
any way. Stated differently, the value ωˆ  can be seen as a measure of the ‘underlying’ 
level of variance for the respective series. The closer the estimated value of the ρ in 
equation (7) is to one the slower qt  approaches ωˆ , and the closer it is to zero the faster it 
approaches ωˆ . The value ρ therefore provides a measure of the long-run persistence.  
The second part of C-GARCH model is the specification for the short-run dynamics, the 
behaviour of the volatility persistence around this long-run time-variable mean, qt: 
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According to this transitory specification, the deviation of the current condition variance 
from the long-run variance mean at time t ( tt q−
2σ ) is affected by the deviation of the 
previous error from the long-run mean )( 1
2
1 −− − tt qε  and the previous deviation of the 
condition variance from the long-run mean )( 1
2
1 −− − tt qσ . Therefore, in keeping with its 
GARCH theoretical background, the C-GARCH specification continues to take account 
of the persistence of volatility clustering by having the conditional variance as a 
function of past errors. As the transitory component describes the relationship between 
the short-run and long-run influence, decline rates of past shocks values of (γ+λ) closer 
to one imply slower convergence of the short-run and long-run influence decline rates, 
and values closer to zero the opposite. The value (γ+λ) is therefore a measure of how 
long this short-run influence decline rate is. 
  
3. Data and Empirical Results 
3.1. Data 
We use monthly data of eighty bilateral real exchange rates against United States dollar, 
from January 1970 to December 20113, taken from the International Monetary Fund's 
International Financial Statistics and the Federal Reserve Board’s Financial Statistics.4 
We consider six sets of countries: American countries (Canada, Mexico, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela); European countries (European Union-125, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Norway, Russia, 
Switzerland and Turkey); Middle East countries (Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, Saudi 
Arabia); Oceania countries (Australia and New Zealand); Asian countries (Bangladesh, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Taiwan) and African countries (Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia). 
 
All real exchange rate series have been corrected of outliers following the methodology 
developed by Gómez and Maravall (1996).6 
 
                                                 
3 The sample size for  Nicaragua covers the period 1988:1-2011:12. 
4 Data collected by Mathew Shane, Economic Research Service, United States Department of 
Agriculture. 
5 The European Union (EU) was established on 1 November 1993 with 12 Member States (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United 
Kingdom). Their number has grown to the present 28 through a series of enlargements In our analysis we 
use the original EU-12 as an additional “country”. 
6 We have made computations using the Program TSW. 
  
Given that the countries in our sample present different exchange rate regimes that can 
change under the period studied, we have used the “natural fine classification” of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), updated to December 2010 by Ilzetzki, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2011), to distinguish between a wide range of de facto regimes: 1) no separate 
legal tender; 2) pre announced peg or currency board arrangement; 3) pre announced 
horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%; 4) de facto peg; 5) pre announced 
crawling peg; 6) pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%; 7) 
de factor crawling peg; 8) de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%; 
9) pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to ±2%; 10) de facto 
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±5%; 11) moving band that is narrower 
than or equal to ±2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time); 12) 
managed floating; 13) freely floating; 14) freely falling; 15) dual market in which 
parallel market data is missing.  
 
As the tables in Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) provide monthly data until 
December 2010, we can identify the exact date of the change of regime. For 2011, we 
assume that there is not modification in the exchange rate regime. 
 
Regarding the financial crisis dates, we make use of the information provided by 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart (2010). The former covers all systemically 
important banking, currency and debt crises (hereafter SBC, CC and DC, respectively) 
for the period 1970 to 2007 for 261 countries, while the later offers the individual 
timeline of public and private debts, banking, sovereign domestic and external debt 
crises , and hyperinflation, for 70 countries, from their independence to 2010. 
 
  
3.2. Empirical Results  
3.2.1. Structural Breaks Results 
Tables 1a-f present the detected numbers and dates of structural breaks7 and their 
connection with an economic event for our examined set of countries. Recall that these 
breaks are searched endogenously from the data and our procedure does not rely on pre-
test information to determine them, thereby avoiding the possible problem of “data 
mining”.  
 
To facilitate the interpretation of Tables 1a-f, we have indicated with an arrow if 
volatility increases (↑) or decreases (↓) after the structural break identified as crisis 
episodes (i.e., systematic banking crisis, SBC; currency crisis, CC and debt crisis, DC). 
As for the breakpoints associated with variations in the exchange rate regime (nominal 
exchange regime change, NERc), we have used the same convention, so an arrow 
pointing downwards (↓) would indicate the volatility decreases and an arrow pointing 
upwards (↑) would indicate the volatility decreases. Additionally, ↑* indicates the 
volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed regime to a 
more flexible one and ↓* indicates the volatility decreases when the nominal exchange 
rate goes from a more flexible regime to a more fixed one. Moreover, in Tables 1a-f, 
there is a set of breaks that can be associated with specific economic events of each 
examined country (that we have denoted as country specific events, CSE). 
 
[Tables 1a-f, here] 
 
                                                 
7 In order to save space, the numerical results of Bai and Perron’s tests are not reported in Table 1 but 
they are available upon request. 
  
All in all, findings from our structural breaks analysis suggest several empirical 
regularities8. First, our results seem to indicate that exchange rate regimes do really 
matter, as we obtain evidence in favour of nominal regimes affecting RER variation. 
Second, we detect, in almost all cases that the more flexible the exchange rate regime, 
the higher the volatility of the RER, as well as an increase in RER volatility after a 
financial crisis in almost all cases. Third, we document an alteration in the nominal 
exchange rate regime towards a more flexible one after the event of a crisis.9 This result 
is in line with that of Fornaro (2011)’s, who claims the superiority of flexible exchange 
rate regimes compared to pegs both for the purpose of crisis times stabilization and as 
crises prevention devices. Finally, while two of the strongest financial crises, the 
Russian and Asian financial crises, have been detected using the procedure by Bai and 
Perron (1998, 2003), there is no evidence of a significant change in RER volatility 
around 2007 or 2008 capturing the recent global financial crisis. This could be related to 
the fact that various countries made have interfered in foreign exchange markets (using 
intervention and capital controls) to restrain tensions in the foreign exchange markets 
(see, e. g., Deutsche Bundesbank, 2010). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
institutional idiosyncrasies or major economic events are still at play, given the 
heterogeneity of break points detected across countries associated with country specific 
events. The reason for this heterogeneity is reserved for future research. 
 
                                                 
8 We summarize the results by pointing out the main regularities. The reader is asked to browse through 
Tables 1a to f to find evidence for particular countries or group of countries of her/his special interest and 
the respective estimated break points. A more detailed account of the results by groups of countries can 
be found in Morales-Zumaquero and Sosvilla-Rivero (2012). 
9 Except for in Malaysia, Egypt and Senegal. 
  
3.2.2. Permanent and Transitory Components Results 
Tables 2a-f report coefficient estimates for the C-GARCH models obtained by 
maximum likelihood for each real exchange rate. Table 3 exhibits a summary of results 
with the numbers and percentages of significant coefficient estimates. 
 
From these tables empirical results suggest a central message: evidence in favour that 
there exists a permanent-transitory component decomposition for our set of real 
exchange rates10.  In addition, in order to evaluate the empirical relevance of our 
analysis, we compare the performance of the C-GARCH model to the GARCH model. 
It is worth noting that the C-GARCH model reduces to the GARCH (1, 1) model either 
 =   =0 or  =  = 0. On the basis of Wald tests on these coefficients, we can see the 
null hypothesis is decisively rejected in almost all cases in favour of C-GARCH 
specification over the GARCH(1,1) specification, giving further support for our 
specification strategy. 
 
[Table 2a-f, here] 
[Table 3, here] 
 
From visual inspection of figures plotting the estimated of the total conditional variance 
and its two components (permanent and transitory), of the monthly difference in real 
exchange rate for all countries under study, two regularities seem to appear11: (1) there 
is a change in volatility when a financial crisis occurs: sometimes the permanent 
                                                 
10 This is the main regularity. The reader is asked to browse through Tables 2a to f and Table 3 to find 
evidence for particular countries or group of countries of her/his special interest. A more detailed account 
of the results by groups of countries can be found in Morales-Zumaquero and Sosvilla-Rivero (2012). 
 
11 To save space, we do not show here these figures. They are available in Morales-Zumaquero and 
Sosvilla-Rivero (2012). 
  
component has smooth movements around the total GARCH volatility while the 
transitory component raises and other times the three volatilities (the total GARCH 
permanent and transitory) move together during a financial crisis; and (2) it looks that 
the transitory component is much more volatile, responding largely to economic events. 
Taken together, these findings imply that during financial crises, exchange rates are 
determined not only by traditional factors but also, to a major extent, by subjective 
perception of market participants. 
 
Finally, and in line with Sarno and Valente (2006), a pattern seems to emerge relating 
countries with long periods of fixed exchange rate regimes and higher degree of 
persistence in RER volatility. 
 
[Figures 1 to 6, here] 
 
We further analyse the connection between the behaviour of the permanent-transitory 
components with both the occurrence of a change in the nominal exchange rate regime 
and the existence of a SBC and/or a CC and/or a DC. Tables 4a-e and 5a-e show the 
results. In the first column of Tables 4a-e we present the dating of financial crises using 
the information provided by Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart (2010). In the 
first column of Tables 5a-e we present the structural breaks associated with a change in 
the nominal exchange rate regime. In the second column of Tables 4 and 5, we present 
the results of three variance equality tests (VET): the Bartlett test, the Levene test and 
the Brown-Forsythe test.12  
 
                                                 
12 For details see Sokal and Rohlf (1995), Levene (1960), Conover, et al. (1981), Brown and Forsythe 
(1974a, 1974b) and Neter, et al. (1996). 
  
[Tables 4a-e, here] 
[Tables 5a-e, here] 
 
All in all, findings indicate that RER volatility change when there is a variation in the 
nominal exchange rate and after the occurrence of a financial crisis. Indeed, we observe 
that for almost all countries, and in almost all variations in the nominal exchange rate 
regime and financial crises, volatility equality tests reject the null hypothesis of equal 
variances. It is worth noting that for the European Union countries, there is some 
evidence in favour of a change in RER volatility during the recent global crisis in the 
cases of Belgium (a country with a high public debt to GDP ratio) and Spain (a country 
with a high deficit/GDP ratio). 
 
To gain further insights in the behaviour of the permanent and transitory components of 
the conditional variance, we examine the correlation coefficients between each series. 
The results, not shown here to save space but available from the authors upon request, 
suggest a limited degree of co-movement for the permanent components in all countries 
under study (with low correlation coefficients) and a still weaker correlations between 
the transitory components. There is only evidence of relevant correlations between the 
permanent components for European Union countries, suggesting the existence of some 
degree of commonality between them. This could be reflecting the closer economic and 
monetary cooperation between European countries that formally started in 1979 with 
the ERM and culminated in 1999 with the introduction of a single currency and a 
common monetary policy. 
 
  
4. Concluding Remarks 
Real exchange rate (RER) volatility is an issue of great importance to both businesses 
and policymakers. Empirical evidence of the existence of structural breaks in financial 
time series made this area of research very active in the recent years. Much of attention 
in the literature has been given to structural breaks in volatility, which imply changes in 
the risk behaviour of investors due to important financial events, such as the 1987 stock 
market crash, the dot-com bubble in 1995-2000 and the subprime mortgage crisis. 
 
The purpose of our paper has been to contribute to the debate on a possible relationship 
between structural breaks in RER volatility and changes in exchange-rate regimes or 
financial crises. To that end, using data for the period 1970 to 2011, we have first 
examined the instability in terms of multiple structural breaks in the variance in the time 
series of eighty countries compromising American, European, Middle East, Oceania, 
Asian and African countries. In particular, we have presented the results of applying 
two alternative procedures for searching endogenously without using a priori 
information: the OLS-based tests to detect multiple structural breaks, proposed by Bai 
and Perron (1998, 2003) and several procedures based on Information Criterion joint 
with the so called sequential procedure suggested by Bai and Perron (2003). We then 
employ the component GARCH model proposed by Engle and Lee (1999) to 
decompose volatility into a permanent long-run trend component and a transitory short-
run component that is mean-reverting towards the long-run trend. 
 
The main results are as follows. Firstly, we found substantial evidence of structural 
breaks in volatility across investigated RER. Secondly, there is high heterogeneity 
between series regarding the dates in which the break points are located, although major 
  
financial crises seem to coincide with most of them. Thirdly, and in line with previous 
empirical research, we document higher RER volatility under flexible exchange rate 
regimes using a de facto exchange rate classification to correct for possible 
inconsistencies between the commitment of the central bank and its observed behaviour. 
This finding could be related to the relative sluggishness in price adjustment see- e. e. g, 
Mussa, 1986; Baxter and Stockman 1989; Flood and Rose, 1995; Ghosh et al. 1997; 
Liang 1998) or could derived from a greater incidence of real and nominal shocks under 
flexible regimes (see Stockman 1983; Grilli and Kaminsky 1991; Clarida and Gali 
1994; and Rogers 1999, among others). Finally, the decomposition of total volatility 
into its components suggest that the permanent component tracks total RER volatility 
reflecting the evolution of fundamental factors and the transitory component responds 
largely to market expectations, rising during the detected structural breaks. 
 
Finally, regarding financial crisis, our results suggest that, in a context of increasing 
interconnectedness of financial institutions and markets, RER volatility is exacerbated 
during crisis periods.  
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Table 1a. Structural Breaks in Volatility: Real Exchange Rates, America 
       Period: 1/1970-12/2011            Specifications:   { } 415.0011 ===== mpqtz ε  
    SPa Dates and Explanationb 
North 
Canada    2 Jun 1976: CSE;                          Nov 2002: NERc ↑*c 
Mexico    3 Apr 1981:NERc↑*, SBCb↑,DC↑;  Mar 1988: NERc↓;   Dec 1994: NERc↑*, SBC↑ 
Central  
Costa Rica    2 Jul 1977:  CSE;                          Nov 1983: NERc↓* 
El Salvador    2 Sep 1984: CSE;                          Jun 1993: CSE                   
Guatemala    1 Jan 1995:  CSE 
Honduras    3 Aug 1980: CSE                               Mar 1990:NERc↑*, CC ↑;  Dec 1998: NERc↓* 
Nicaragua    2 Feb 1992: NERc ↓*                   Jul 1998: CSE 
Panama    1 Dec 1992: CSE 
Caribbean  
Dominican Republic 3 Jan 1985: NERc↑*, CC ↑;             Aug 1991: NERc↓ *;             Jan 2005: NERc↓* 
Jamaica  2 Jan 1983: NERc↑*, CC↑;              Jul 1996: NERc↓*, SBC↓ 
Trinidad Tobago  1 May 1976: NERc↓* 
South  
Argentina    3 Feb 1981: NERc↑*, SBC↑;          Mar 1991: NERc ↓*;             Oct 2001: NERc↑*, SBC↑, DC↑ 
Brazil    1 Jul 1982: CC↑ 
Chile    2 Jun 1976: NERc↓*, SBC↓;       Jan 2001: CSE 
Colombia  1 Jan 1994: NERc↑*; 
Ecuador    2 Mar 1982: NERc↑*, SBC↑, CC↑, DC↑;                             Apr 2001: NERc↓* 
Paraguay    3 Mar 1985: NERc↑* ;                Jan 1991: NERc ↓* ;        Mar 2002: CC↑ 
Peru    3 Oct 1977: NERc↑* ;                 Aug 1986: NERc ↑* ;       Jan 1990: CSE 
Uruguay    1 Jun 1976: CSE 
Venezuela    2 Jun 1978: SBC↑;                      Nov 1986: NERc↑* 
         Notes 
       a. SP: number of structural breaks selected by the sequential procedure by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). 
          b. NERc: Nominal exchange rate regime change; SBC: Systematic Banking Crisis; CC: Currency Crisis; DC: Debt Crisis; CSE: Country Specific Event. 
     c. ↑ indicates the volatility increases and ↓ indicates the volatility decreases after the structural break identified as crisis episodes. 
d.  ↑* indicates the volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed  regime to a more  flexible one  and ↓*  indicates the volatility decreases 
when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more flexible regimen to a more fixed one. 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 1b. Structural Breaks in Volatility: Real Exchange Rates, Europe 
       Period: 1/1970-12/2011            Specifications:   { } 415.0011 ===== mpqtz ε  
    SPa Dates and Explanationb 
European Union 
EU-12 2 Jan 1980: NERc↑* ;                      Sep 1992: EMSC 
Austria    2 Jul 1980: NERc ↑  ;                       Sep 1992: EMSC 
Belgium    2 Jan 1980: CSE;                              Sep 1992: EMSC 
Denmark    2 Jan 1980: NERc↑ ;                        Sep 1992: EMSC 
Finland    2 Jan 1980: CSE;                              Sep 1992: EMSC 
France    2 Mar 1979: NERc↑;                        Sep 1992: EMSC 
Germany    2 Jan 1980:  CSE;                             Sep 1992: EMSC 
Greece    1 Jul 1981: NERc↑*; 
Italy    2 Jan 1980: CSE;                                    Sep 1992: EMSC 
Ireland    2 Mar 1979: NERc ↑* ;                          Sep 1992: EMSC 
Netherlands 2 Jan 1980: CSE;                                    Sep 1992: EMSC 
Portugal    1 Aug 1993: NERc ↓*; 
Spain    1 Apr 1978: SBC↑*; 
Sweden    1 Dec 1991: SBC↑*; 
United Kingdom  3 Apr 1979: CSE;                                  Sep 1992: EMSC, NERc↑* ;  Mar 2003:CSE 
Central and Eastern  
Czech Republic  2 Aug 1981:  NERc ↑*;                        Mar 1994: NERc↑* 
Hungary    2 Jun 1979:    NERc↓* ;                       Aug 2005: NERc↓* 
Poland    1 Oct 1977:   NERc↑* 
Others 
Norway    1 Sep 1980: CSE 
Russia    4 Aug 1981: CSE;                               Jan 1992: NERc↑*;      Aug 1998: NERc↑*, RFC ↑;  Aug 2005:NERc↑* 
Switzerland  2 Jul 1977:  CSE;                           Sep 1993: CSE 
Turkey    2 Jun 1994:  CSE;                          Sep 2000:  SBC↑* 
         Notes 
         a. SP: number of structural breaks selected by the sequential procedure by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). 
  b. NERc: Nominal exchange rate regime change; RFC: Russian Financial Crisis; SBC: Systematic Banking Crisis; CC: Currency Crisis; DC: Debt Crisis;  
   EMSC: European Monetary System Crisis; CSE: Country Specific Event. 
       c. ↑ indicates the volatility increases and ↓ indicates the volatility decreases after the structural break identified as crisis episodes. 
   d.  ↑* indicates the volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed  regime to a more  flexible one  and ↓*  indicates the volatility decreases 
    when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more flexible regimen to a more fixed one. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1c. Structural Breaks in Volatility: Real Exchange Rates, Middle East 
       Period: 1/1970-12/2011            Specifications:   { } 415.0011 ===== mpqtz ε  
    SPa Dates and Explanationb 
Israel 3 Oct 1977: NERc↑*, SBC ↑;      Oct 1992: CSE;                           Nov 2001: CSE 
Jordan    3 Feb 1975: NERc↑*;                    Feb 1990: NERc↓*, SBC↓, CC↓, DC↓;           Aug 1995: NERc↓* 
Kuwait    1 Sep 1992: CSE 
Syria    1 Oct 2004: CSE 
Saudi Arabia  3 Sep 1978:  CSE                      Jun 1989:  CSE                               Dec 2003: CSE 
         Notes 
         a. SP: number of structural breaks selected by the sequential procedure by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). 
         b. NERc: Nominal exchange rate regime change; SBC: Systematic Banking Crisis; CC: Currency Crisis; DC: Debt Crisis; CSE: Country Specific Event. 
    c. ↑ indicates the volatility increases and ↓ indicates the volatility decreases after the structural break identified as crisis episodes. 
d.  ↑* indicates the volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed  regime to a more  flexible one  and ↓*  indicates the volatility decreases 
when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more flexible regimen to a more fixed one. 
 
 
Table 1d. Structural Breaks in Volatility: Real Exchange Rates, Oceania 
       Period: 1/1970-12/2011            Specifications:   { } 415.0011 ===== mpqtz ε  
    SPa Dates and Explanationb 
Australia 1 Nov 1982: NERc↑* 
New Zealand  1 Mar 1985:  NERc ↑*                            
         Notes 
          a. SP: number of structural breaks selected by the sequential procedure by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). 
           b. NERc: Nominal exchange rate regime change; SBC: Systematic Banking Crisis; CC: Currency Crisis; DC: Debt Crisis; CSE: Country Specific Event. 
      c. ↑ indicates the volatility increases and ↓ indicates the volatility decreases after the structural break identified as crisis episodes. 
  d.  ↑* indicates the volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed  regime to a more  flexible one  and ↓*  indicates the volatility decreases  
  when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more flexible regimen to a more fixed one. 
 
 
  
Table 1e. Structural Breaks in Volatility: Real Exchange Rates, Asia 
       Period: 1/1970-12/2011            Specifications:   { } 415.0011 ===== mpqtz ε  
    SPa Dates and Explanationb 
South  
Bangladesh 3 Mar 1976: CC↑;                  Oct 1982: CSE;                   Jul 1994: CSE 
India    3 Jul 1979: NERc ↓*;            Jan 1999: AFC ↑ *;             Dec 2004: NERc↑* 
Indonesia    4 Mar 1976: CSE;                  Apr 1985: CSE  Jul 1997: NERc↑*,AFC (SBC)↑;   Aug 2003: CSE 
Malaysia    2 Jul 1998: NERc↑*, AFC (CC) ↑ ;                                   Jul 2005: CSE 
Pakistan    1 Jun 1982: NERc↓ 
Philippines    1 Jul 1997: NERc↑*, AFC (SBC) ↑ 
Singapore    1 Jul 1997: AFC↑* 
Sri Lanka    3 Nov 1981: NERc ↓*;          Sep 1989: NERc↑, SBC↑;  Dec 2004: CSE 
Thailand    1 Jul 1997: NERc, AFC (SBC, CC) ↑ 
North 
China    4 Aug 1977: CSE;                  Dec 1984: CSE;                    Jan 1994: NERc  ↓*;        Jun 2005: CSE            
Hong Kong 2 Jun 1977:   CSE;                  Oct 1983: NERc↓* 
Japan    2 Nov 1977: NERc ↑*;           Jan 2000: CSE 
Korea    2 Nov 1985: SBC ↓;                Nov 1997: NERc↑*, AFC (SBC) ↑ 
Taiwan    1 Jul 1985: CSE 
         Notes 
         a. SP: number of structural breaks selected by the sequential procedure by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). 
          b. NERc: Nominal exchange rate regime change; AFC: Asian Financial Crisis; SBC: Systematic Banking Crisis; CC: Currency Crisis; DC: Debt Crisis;  
CSE: Country Specific Event.  
     c. ↑ indicates the volatility increases and ↓ indicates the volatility decreases after the structural break identified as crisis episodes. 
 d.  ↑* indicates the volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed  regime to a more  flexible one  and ↓*  indicates the volatility decreases  
  when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more flexible regimen to a more fixed one. 
 
 
  
Table 1f. Structural Breaks in Volatility: Real Exchange Rates, Africa 
       Period: 1/1970-12/2011            Specifications:   { } 415.0011 ===== mpqtz ε  
    SPa Dates and Explanationb 
North  
Algeria 2 Oct 1980:  CSE;            Mar 1994: NERc↓, CC↓ 
Egypt    3 Jan 1979: CC↑               May 1984: DC ↑                       Oct 1991: NERc↓*, SBC↓ 
Morocco    0  
Tunisia    0  
Subshaharan  
Benin    1 Dec 1979: CSE 
Cameroon    2 Aug 1980:  CSE;           Dec 1994: NERc↓* 
Congo    1 Mar 1976: NERc↑*, CC↑ 
Cote d'Ivoire  1 Mar 1994: CC↓ 
Ghana    3 Nov 1976:   CSE;           Sep 1987: NERc↓ *;                  Aug 2000: CC↓ 
Kenya    1 Dec 1978: NERc↑*; 
Mozambique 3 May 1976: CSE;             Nov 1987: SBC↑, CC↑;             Feb 1996: CSE 
Nigeria  3 Sep 1984: NERc↑;          Mar 1996: NERc↓*, CC ↓;        Jul: 2005: CSE 
Senegal  1 Nov 1994: NERc↓*, CC↓ 
Sierra Leone  2 May 1983: CC↑ ;             Feb 1990: SBC↓, CC↓ 
South Africa  2 Jan 1979: NERc↑;           Nov 1989: SBC↑ 
Tanzania    2 Jan 1979: NERc↑;           May 2001: CSE 
Zambia    3 Jul 1976: NERc↑* ;         Jul 1983: NERc↑*;                    Apr 1995: SBC↓, CC↓ 
         Notes 
         a. SP: number of structural breaks selected by the sequential procedure by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). 
         b. NERc: Nominal exchange rate regime change; SBC: Systematic Banking Crisis; CC: Currency Crisis; DC: Debt Crisis; CSE: Country Specific Event. 
     c. ↑ indicates the volatility increases and ↓ indicates the volatility decreases after the structural break identified as crisis episodes. 
 d.  ↑* indicates the volatility increases when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more fixed  regime to a more  flexible one  and ↓*  indicates the volatility decreases  
  when the nominal exchange rate goes from a more flexible regimen to a more fixed one. 
 
  
Table 2a. Volatility C-GARCH Model Estimates: America 
 Permanent Component Transitory Component Wald Testsc 
       LR half life
b    SR half life   =  = 0 = = 0 
North 
Canada 0.0009 (0.102)a 0.999* (165.9) 0.016  (1.529) 692 0.132* (2.118) 0.162 (0.443) 0.56 29006.13* 5.993** 
Mexico 0.001*** (1.6) 0.997* (609.9) -0.007 (-0.728) 231 0.440* (5.884) 0.366* (5.949) 3.21 523465.4* 169.03* 
Central 
Costa Rica 0.0002 (1.198) 0.977* (47.292) 0.190* (3.572) 29.78 0.291* (4.263) 0.009 (0.073) 0.57 3310.08* 18.47* 
El Salvador 0.0001* (3.450) 0.939* (40.917) 0.186* (4.315) 11.01 -0.014* (-2.035) -0.976* (-61.57) 69 1674.48* 7573.22* 
Guatemala 0.0002* (6.157) 0.908* (19.063) 0.118* (2.020) 7.18 0.079 (1.006) 0.112 (0.154) 0.42 460.02* 1.029 
Honduras 0.00007* (3.26) 0.970* (59.382) 0.098* (3.273) 22.75 0.167* (2.766) -0.220 (-0.819) 0.23 3840.99* 3840.99* 
Nicaragua 0.0002* (2.143) 0.940* (48.728) -0.557* (-2.742) 11.20 0.846* (5.681) 0.084 (0.173) 10 37730.76* 1138332* 
Panama 0.00002* (7.76) 0.962* (42.323) 0.017 (0.969) 17.89 0.196* (2.583) 0.142 (0.653) 0.64 1878.95* 7.89** 
Caribbean 
Dom. Rep. 0.006 (0.083) 0.997* (40.650) 0.272* (8.033) 231 -0.019 (-1.332) -0.914* (-17.69) 9.84 2011.62* 785.70* 
Jamaica 0.0002* (3.670) 0.754* (2.831) 0.904 (0.290) 2.45 -0.469 (-0.152) 1.063 (0.286) 1.33 109.18* 14.63* 
Trinidad T. 0.0001* (3.262) 0.962* (53.658) 0.128* (2.751) 17.89 0.035 (0.571) 0.578 (0.812) 1.42 3033.75* 0.83 
South 
Argentina 0.022 (0.089) 0.997* (40.598) 0.284* (6.558) 231 0.105* (1.794) -0.521*** (-1.7) 0.79 3846.65* 17.30* 
Brazil 0.001 (0.411) 0.999* (484.09) 0.159* (8.340) 692 0.075 (0.043) 0.436 (1.012) 1.03 23582.1* 4.80*** 
Chile -0.001 (0.614) 0.999* (20756) -0.004* (-24.44) 692 0.156* (11.42) 0.756* (35.39) 7.52 590000* 27941.80* 
Colombia 0.004 (0.204) 0.999* (219.23) 0.119* (3.637) 692 0.472* (6.486) 0.026 (0.222) 0.99 53920* 46.94* 
Ecuador 0.003 (0.742) 0.999* (2134.4) 0.221* (5.564) 692 0.241* (5.001) -0.053 (-0.392) 0.41 4559045* 40.54* 
Paraguay 0.0006* (3.523) 0.963* (50.87) 0.087* (3.365) 18.38 0.189* (3.141) 0.144 (0.671) 0.63 2638.90* 12.19* 
Peru 0.004 (0.213) 0.999* (223.06) 0.321* (8.204) 692 0.353* (7.626) 0.192* (1.850) 1.14 52811.58* 116.45* 
Uruguay 0.013 (0.218) 0.998* (190.84) 0.263* (9.007) 346 0.023 (1.451) -0.932* (-18.16) 7.26 36884.18* 811.56* 
Venezuela -0.003 (-0.260) 0.999* (213.14) 0.213* (4.122) 692 0.387* (5.688) 0.111 (0.765) 0.99 55512.98* 32.49* 
Notes:  a. Parentheses are used to indicate z-statistics. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
             b. The long-run and short-run half-lives are measured using the following formulae: ˆ ˆ( ) (1/ 2) / ( )HLLR Ln Lnρ ρ= and ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) (1/ 2) / ( ).HLSR Ln Lnγ λ γ λ+ = +  
             c. Wald tests on coefficient restrictions are Chi-square statistics with 2 degrees of freedom. 
 
  
Table 2b. Volatility C-GARCH Model Estimates: Europe 
 Permanent Component Transitory Component Wald Testsc 
       LR half life
b    SR half life   =  = 0 = = 0 
European Union 
EU-12 0.0008* (2.64)a 0.981* (91.89) 0.075* (3.38) 36 0.063 (1.037) -0.209 (-0.297) 0.36 8476.96* 1.30 
Austria 0.0007* (9.727) 0.980* (187.22) -0.009 (-0.222) 34 0.053 (1.349) 0.877* (10.55) 9.55 35084.91* 112.48* 
Belgium 0.0007* (6.997) 0.972* (119.90) 0.027** (1.742) 24.40 0.089 (1.352) -0.138 (-0.349) 0.23 14718.09* 2.08 
Denmark 0.0007* (6.998) 0.983* (195.02) 0.007 (0.282) 40.42 0.052*** (1.64) 0.8405* (5.222) 6 38049.57* 38.33* 
Finland 0.003 (1.169) 0.999* (930.48) 0.033* (3.526) 692 0.105* (4.328) -0.838* (-10.94) 2.24 894369.1* 254.39* 
France 0.004* (3.541) 0.999* (3624.8) 0.087* (5.057) 692 0.100* (2.968) -0.526* (2.133) 0.81 13210952* 24.34* 
Germany 0.0007* (9.154) 0.980* (167.26) -0.009 (-0.287) 34.30 0.073* (2.111) 0.844* (12.143) 8 28339.69* 150.54* 
Greece 0.0007* (50.71) 0.989* (1782.5) -0.032* (-28.12) 62.66 0.086* (2.780) 0.710* (5.452) 3 48651090* 80.59* 
Italy 0.0009* (101.1) 0.992* (45802) -0.030* (-8.193) 86.29 0.134* (3.258) 0.593* (4.415) 2.17 12400000* 106.12* 
Ireland 0.0007* (2.838) 0.980* (77.84) 0.072* (3.026) 34 -0.093** (-1.74) 0.227 (0.371) 0.34 6086.87* 3.27 
Netherlands 0.0007* (7.988) 0.982* (192.82) 0.003 (0.154) 38.16 0.078** (1.707) 0.763* (3.648) 4 37502.63* 52.05* 
Portugal 0.0007* (7.756) 0.973* (48.32) 0.013 (0.862) 25.32 0.185* (2.755) -0.116 (-0.594) 0.25 2335.74 7.89** 
Spain 0.0008* (33.13) 0.992 (6243.3) -0.015* (-3.29) 86.29 0.147* (2.673) -0.020 (-0.114) 0.33 39298467* 7.17** 
Sweden 0.0007* (10.55) 0.983* (263.44) 0.002 (0.331) 40 0.206* (3.624) -0.160 (-0.947) 0.22 70547.28* 15.47* 
United K. 0.0007* (4.948) 0.976* (89.56) 0.037* (1.854) 28.53 0.243* (3.656) -0.004 (-0.020) 0.48 8200.69* 13.45* 
Central and Eastern 
Czech Rep. 0.0005 (0.320) 0.999* (549.64) 0.165* (7.638) 692 0.040 (1.045) -0.828* (-4.176) 2.9 319447.7* 45.11* 
Hungary 0.005* (3.554) 0.998* (3268) 0.053* (4.615) 346 0.160* (4.485) -0.651* (-5.207) 0.95 11139857 191.53* 
Poland 0.003* (1.980) 0.999* (1174.6) 0.090* (10.733) 692 0.258* (7.496) -0.035 (-0.228) 0.46 1380914 56.40* 
Others 
Norway 0.0006* (8.443) 0.966 (84.18) 0.013 (0.643) 20 0.191* (3.415) 0.310*** (1.62) 1 7722.33* 20.79* 
Russia 0.0004*** (1.6) 0.928* (23.91) 0.306* (2.073) 9.27 0.394* (4.930) 0.394* (4.930) 0.58 729.12* 25.47* 
Switzerland 0.0008* (9.557) 0.975* (134.66) 0.013 (1.316) 27.37 0.057 (1.455) -0.766* (-3.607) 2 20275.78* 28.02* 
Turkey 0.001* (13.47) 0.445 (0.195) -0.913 (-0.011) 0.85 1.194 (0.014) -0.802 (-0.010) 0.74 3.75 3.35 
Notes:  a. Parentheses are used to indicate z-statistics. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
             b. The long-run and short-run half-lives are measured using the following formulae: ˆ ˆ( ) (1/ 2) / ( )HLLR Ln Lnρ ρ= and ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) (1/ 2) / ( ).HLSR Ln Lnγ λ γ λ+ = +  
             c. Wald tests on coefficient restrictions are Chi-square statistics with 2 degrees of freedom. 
  
 
Table 2c. Volatility C-GARCH Model Estimates: Middle East 
 Permanent Component Transitory Component Wald Testsc 
       LR half life
b    SR half life   =  = 0 = = 0 
Israel 0.0004* (5.54)a 0.908* (21.74) 0.262 (1.116) 7.18 -0.238 (-1.047) 1.018* (2.949) 2.79 1365.24* 135.78* 
Jordan 0.0002* (4.21) 0.977* (122.03) 0.067* (2.066) 29.78 0.046 (0.895) 0.572 (0.885) 1.44 18709.23* 3.05 
Kuwait 0.0002* (5.62) 0.977* (173.33) 0.041* (2.629) 29.78 0.139* (3.602) -0.609* (-3.682) 0.91 32396.31* 61.61* 
Syria 0.0004* (17.8) 0.547 (0.268) 0.0122 (0.164) 1.15 0.134 (0.066) -0.504* (-5.340) 0.70 1.37 272.06* 
Saudi Arabia 0.00005 (1.31) 0.979* (45.98) 0.158 (1.288) 32.66 0.034 (1.288) -0.949* (-16.34) 7.80 2223.80* 853.06* 
Notes:  a. Parentheses are used to indicate z-statistics. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
             b. The long-run and short-run half-lives are measured using the following formulae: ˆ ˆ( ) (1/ 2) / ( )HLLR Ln Lnρ ρ= and ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) (1/ 2) / ( ).HLSR Ln Lnγ λ γ λ+ = +  
             c. Wald tests on coefficient restrictions are Chi-square statistics with 2 degrees of freedom. 
 
Table 2d. Volatility C-GARCH Model Estimates: Oceania 
 Permanent Component Transitory Component Wald Testsc 
       LR half life
b    SR half life   =  = 0 = = 0 
Australia 0.007 (0.420)a 0.998* (363.92) 0.152* (4.983) 346 0.154* (4.073) -0.381* (-2.001) 0.47 132868.8* 22.86* 
New Zealand 0.001* (4.512) 0.971* (92.653) 0.065* (2.410) 0.76 0.113* (1.943) 0.292 (0.873) 0.76 11852.60* 5.09*** 
Notes:  a. Parentheses are used to indicate z-statistics. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
             b. The long-run and short-run half-lives are measured using the following formulae: ˆ ˆ( ) (1/ 2) / ( )HLLR Ln Lnρ ρ= and ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) (1/ 2) / ( ).HLSR Ln Lnγ λ γ λ+ = +  
             c. Wald tests on coefficient restrictions are Chi-square statistics with 2 degrees of freedom. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2e. Volatility C-GARCH Model Estimates: Asia 
 Permanent Component Transitory Component Wald Testsc 
       LR half life
b    SR half life   =  = 0 = = 0 
North 
Bangladesh 0.0038 (0.108)a 0.998* (78.64) 0.236* (6.206) 346 0.065 (1.133) 0.205 (0.404) 0.33 6374.09* 1.33 
India 0.0003* (3.734) 0.902* (21.35) 0.259* (3.925) 6.72 0.041 (1.444) -0.867* (-8.153) 3.62 472.17* 168.47* 
Indonesia 0.0007 (0.668) 0.996* (164.21) 0.100* (3.560) 173 0.472* (12.72) 0.123* (2.150) 1.33 46983.69* 197.99* 
Malaysia 0.0025 (0.138) 0.999* (147.42) 0.159 (0.028) 692 0.151* (2.955) -0.389 (-1.529) 0.48 22345.02* 42.54* 
Pakistan 0.0004* (4.598) 0.971* (0.010) 0.042* (2.766) 23.55 0.336* (4.846) 0.097 (0.769) 0.77 9351.14* 25.08* 
Philippines 0.0003*** (1.6) 0.971* (53.68) 0.139* (2.195) 24.40 0.318* (5.119) 0.008 (0.061) 0.62 3417.36* 26.25* 
Singapore 0.0002* (8.679) 0.804* (5.118) 1.430 (0.077) 317 -1.403 (-0.076) 2.189 (0.118) 2.38 113.16* 75.86* 
Sri Lanka 0.0003* (22.91) 0.970* (111.36) -0.052* (5.131) 22.75 0.457* (5.131) 0.168*** (1.69) 1.47 76478.44* 39.70* 
Thailand 0.0002*** (1.6) 0.975* (46.05) 0.161* (4.056) 23.37 0.074 (1.282) -0.511 (-1.070) 0.84 2122.65* 9.86* 
South 
China 0.0001 (1.231) 0.956* (28.78) 0.356* (3.757) 15.40 0.384* (77.18) 0.075 (0.708) 0.89 3395.64* 3056.62* 
Hong Kong 0.00007* (6.36) 0.936* (11.77) 0.092 (0.345) 10.48 0.028 (0.109) 0.805 (0.974) 3.79 1123.73* 2.52 
Japan 0.0008* (11.72) 0.962* (110.92) 0.012 (0.904) 17.89 0.151* (2.865) -0.384* (-1.991) 0.47 14230.64* 17.22* 
Korea 0.0002*** (1.6) 0.989* (143.71) 0.072* (3.191) 62.66 0.315* (5.291) -0.341* (-3.549) 0.19 24982.51* 197.32* 
Taiwan 0.0002* (40.58) 0.986* (1091.5) -0.029* (-29.42) 49.16 0.149* (3.411) 0.500* (3.791) 1.60 37202054* 83.31* 
Notes:  a. Parentheses are used to indicate z-statistics. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
             b. The long-run and short-run half-lives are measured using the following formulae: ˆ ˆ( ) (1/ 2) / ( )HLLR Ln Lnρ ρ= and ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) (1/ 2) / ( ).HLSR Ln Lnγ λ γ λ+ = +  
             c. Wald tests on coefficient restrictions are Chi-square statistics with 2 degrees of freedom. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2f. Volatility C-GARCH Model Estimates: Africa 
 Permanent Component Transitory Component Wald Testsc 
       LR half life
b    SR half life   =  = 0 = = 0 
North 
Algeria 0.0007* (3.81)a 0.979* (103.22) 0.0581* (2.686) 32.65 0.115* (1.922) 0.059 (0.460) 0.39 10655.96* 3.77 
Egypt 0.029 (0.249) 0.998* (194.90) 0.474 (0.048) 346 0.187* (4.748) -0.381* (-5.255) 0.42 38106.97* 58.91* 
Morocco 0.0004* (9.73) 0.939* (24.67) 0.034* (1.814) 11 0.046* (2.535) -0.960* (-35.14) 7.70 814.28* 3019.44* 
Tunisia 0.0005* (7.639) 0.975* (147.55) 0.0007 (0.031) 27.37 0.201* (3.230) 0.579* (4.866) 2.79 23307.10 71.02* 
Sub-Saharan 
Benin 0.014* (4.731) 0.999* (19760) 0.070* (5.245) 692 0.123* (3.454) -0.690* (-4.685) 1.22 39000000* 84.92* 
Cameroon 0.0008* (7.244) 0.975* (89.69) 0.018 (0.783) 27.37 0.079 (1.554) 0.610* (2.018) 1.86 8272.13* 13.13* 
Congo 0.0013* (27.08) 0.981* (380.58) -0.021* (-3.662) 36.13 0.259* (4.423) 0.226* (2.063) 0.96 149811.9* 30.07* 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.0009* (8.249) 0.755* (8.648) 2.728 (0.319) 2.46 -2.665 (-0.312) 3.405 (0.399) 2.30 115.63* 89.76* 
Ghana 0.018 (0.245) 0.999* (239.42) 0.269* (10.63) 692 0.317* (7.598) -0.060 (-0.684) 0.51 62734.08* 101.72* 
Kenya 0.0006* (3.928) 0.958* (50.89) 0.107* (3.814) 16.15 0.229* (4.194) -0.219* (-2.147) 0.15 2749.57* 41.64* 
Mozambique 0.0008 (0.892) 0.984* (54.90) 0.169* (3.012) 43 0.375* (6.000) -0.073 (-0.564) 0.58 4319.73* 44.12* 
Nigeria 0.001* (2.412) 0.972* (53.21) 0.103 (1.431) 24.40 0.184* (2.297) 0.557* (3.208) 0.70 2908.21* 20.81* 
Senegal 0.0010* (7.345) 0.913* (20.95) 1.160* (8.480) 7.61 -1.149* (-7.689) 2.056* (19.04) 7.1 3771.02* 3535.18* 
Sierra Leone 0.0032* (19.32) 0.993* (745.40) -0.241* (-8.537) 98.67 0.651* (128.62) 0.312* (276.20) 17.9 593796.9* 100769.9* 
South Africa 0.0032 (0.283) 0.997* (127.23) 0.076* (3.489) 230 0.220* (4.119) -0.148 (-1.011) 0.26 23789.22* 22.10* 
Tanzania 0.0009* (10.27) 0.951* (72.59) 0.028* (2.279) 230 0.216* (4.082) -0.237** (-1.73) 0.18 7727.32* 40.08* 
Zambia 0.003* (71.57) 0.998* (73788) -0.038* (-99.28) 346 0.466* (8.662) 0.158*** (1.6) 1.46 5.52000000* 899.76* 
Notes:  a. Parentheses are used to indicate z-statistics. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
             b. The long-run and short-run half-lives are measured using the following formulae: ˆ ˆ( ) (1/ 2) / ( )HLLR Ln Lnρ ρ= and ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) (1/ 2) / ( ).HLSR Ln Lnγ λ γ λ+ = +  
             c. Wald tests on coefficient restrictions are Chi-square statistics with 2 degrees of freedom. 
 
 
  
 
 
     Table 3. Summary: Number and Percentage of Significant Coefficient Estimates 
      
America 
(20 countries) 
9/20  (45%) 20/20  (100%) 16/20 (80%) 14/20 (70%) 7/20 (35%) 
Europe  
(EU-12+ 21 countries) 
20/22 (91%) 21/22 (95%) 13/22 (60%) 16/22 (72%) 13/22 (59%) 
Middle East  
(5 countries) 
4/5 (80%) 4/5 (80%) 2/5 (40%) 1/5 (20%) 4/5 (80%) 
Oceania  
(2 countries) 
1/2 (50%) 2/2 (100%) 2/2 (100%) 2/2 (100%) 1/2 (50%) 
Asia  
(14 countries) 
10/14 (71%) 14/14(100%) 11/14 (78%) 9/14 (64%) 6/14 (43%) 
Africa  
(17 countries) 
13/17 (76%) 17/17(100%) 12/17 (70%) 15/17 (88%) 12/17 (70%) 
  
Table 4a. Permanent and Transitory Components: America 
 Financial Crisis Datesa VET
b  
Bartlett Levene B-F 
North 
 Canada - - 
Mexico SBC: 1981, 1994; CC: 1977, 1982, 1995; DC: 1982 
1977: 
199.81 (0.000) 8.74 (0.003) 5.28 (0.022) 
1981-82: 
184.51 (0.000) 5.54 (0.018) 3.40 (0.065) 
1994-95: 
241.21 (0.000) 9.69 (0.002) 4.48 (0.034) 
Central 
Costa Rica SBC: 1987, 1994; CC:1981, 1991; DC: 1981  
 1981: 
3.97 ( 0.046) 6.77 (0.009) 5.79 (0.016) 
1987: 
93.50 (0.000) 47.98 (0.000) 29.61 (0.000) 
1991-94: 
49.26 (0.000) 24.31 (0.000) 14.67 (0.000) 
El Salvador SBC: 1989; CC: 1986  1986-89: 39.17 (0.000) 41.26 (0.000) 25.64 (0.000) 
Guatemala SBC: 2006, CC: 1986 
1986: 
114.7 (0.000) 39.16 (0.000) 19.58 (0.000) 
2006: 
42.65 (0.000) 8.90 (0.003) 5.34 (0.021) 
Honduras CC: 1990; DC: 1981 
1981: 
14.52 (0.000) 2.33 (0.126) 0.707 (0.400) 
1990: 
38.62 (0.000) 17.35 (0.000) 9.26 (0.025) 
Nicaragua SBC: 1996, 2000; CC:1990 
1990: 
618.57 (0.000) 474.45 (0.000) 413.7 (0.000) 
1996: 
1630.0 (0.000) 109.11 (0.000) 32.36 (0.000) 
2000: 
1415.8 (0.000) 52.09 (0.000) 15.72 (0.000) 
Panama SBC: 1988; DC: 1983 
1983: 
32.80 (0.000) 13.22 (0.000) 15.42 (0.000) 
1988: 
11.25 (0.000) 3.63 (0.057) 5.57 (0.018) 
Caribbean 
Dom. Rep. SBC: 2003; CC: 1985, 1990, 2003; DC: 1982, 2003 
1982-85: 
92.26 (0.000) 36.96 (0.000) 13.59 (0.000) 
1990: 
4.27 (0.038) 0.015 (0.902) 0.553 (0.457) 
2003: 
1.94(0.162) 0.838 (0.360) 0.247 (0.619) 
Jamaica SBC: 1996; CC: 1978, 1983, 1991; DC: 1978  
1978:  
90.45 (0.000) 13.16 (0.000)  5.77 (0.016) 
1983:  
153.1 (0.000) 23.88 (0.000) 10.30 (0.001) 
1991: 
0.233 (0.628) 0.629 (0.428) 0.338 (0.560) 
1996:    
43.3(0.000)   9.62 (0.002)  4.53 (0.033) 
Trinidad T. CC: 1986, DC: 1989 1986-89: 157.72 (0.000) 114.46 (0.000) 70.94 (0.000) 
Notes: a. Financial crisis dates from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart (2010); b. Volatility equality tests 
(VET): Bartlett, Levene and Brown-Forsythe tests (p-values in brackets). 
  
Table 4a. Permanent and Transitory Components: America (cont.) 
 Financial Crisis Datesa VET
b  
Bartlett Levene B-F 
South 
Argentina 
SBC: 1980, 1989, 1995, 
2001; CC: 1975, 1981, 
1987, 2002; DC: 1982, 
2001 
1975: 
 134.4 (0.00) 17.99 (0.000) 6.89 (0.008) 
1980-81-82:  
164. 5 (0.000) 30.17 (0.000) 11.12 (0.000) 
1987-89: 
128 (0.000) 29.25 (0.000) 21.4 (0.000) 
1995   
2001-02: 
332.2 (0.000) 44.05 (0.000) 24.89 (0.000) 
Brazil 
SBC: 1990, 1994; CC: 
1976, 1982, 1987, 1992; 
1999; DC:1983 
1976: 
397.38 (0.000) 61.70 (0.000) 49.27 (0.000) 
1982-83: 
19.43 (0.000) 25.12 (0.000) 29.83 (0.000) 
1987:16.49 (0.000) 3.91 (0.048) 8.02 (0.004) 
1990-92-94: 
49.08 (0.000) 14.03 (0.000) 5.45 (0.019) 
1999:  
37.4 (0.000) 9.01 (0.002) 2.65 (0.103) 
Chile SBC: 1976, 1981; CC: 1972, 1982; DC: 1983 
1972: 
 27.6 (0.000) 0.006 (0.980) 0.188 (0.664) 
1976:  
1876 (0.000) 271.8 (0.000) 130.7 (0.000) 
1981-83: 
1964.09 (0.000) 131.59 (0.000) 56.41 (0.000) 
Colombia SBC: 1998               1998:     129 (0.000) 36.34 (0.000) 21.75 (0.000) 
Ecuador 
SBC: 1982, 1998; CC: 
1982, 1999; DC: 1982, 
1999 
             1982:  
98.65 (0.000) 28.25(0.000) 18.05 (0.000) 
        1998-99: 
20.90 (0.000) 11.68(0.000) 11.25 (0.000) 
Paraguay SBC: 1995; CC: 1984, 1989, 2002; DC:1982  
             1982-84: 
30.20 (0.000) 15.50(0.000) 10.94 (0.000) 
            1989: 
  2.45 (0.117) 2.89 (0.089) 2.07 (0.150) 
1995: 
5.18 (0.022) 2.45 (0.117) 1.83 (0.176) 
2002: 
0.959 (0.327) 0.177(0.673) 0.161 (0.688) 
Peru SBC: 1983; CC: 1976, 1981, 1988; DC: 1978  
1976-78: 
937.02 (0.000) 31.49 (0.000) 10.04 (0.000) 
1981-83: 
1425.35 (0.000) 57.23 (0.000) 18.56 (0.000) 
1988:  
28.50 (0.000) 3.67 (0.055) 0.458 (0.498) 
Uruguay 
SBC: 1981, 2002; CC: 
1972, 1983, 1990, 2002; 
DC: 1983, 2002  
1972: 
345.03 (0.000)  237.51(0.000) 89.08 (0.000) 
1981-83: 
504.08 (0.000) 94.33 (0.000) 44.86 (0.000) 
1990:9 
334.98 (0.000) 41.59 (0.000) 19.47 (0.000) 
2002: 
116.19 (0.000) 9.21 (0.002) 3.88 (0.049) 
Venezuela 
SBC: 1994; CC: 1984, 
1989, 1994, 2002; DC: 
1982 
1982-84: 
450.6 (0.000) 112.76(0.000) 74.01 (0.000) 
1989: 
2.738(0.085) 1.608 (0.205) 6.43 (0.011) 
1994: 
0.908 (0.340) 6.89 (0.008) 9.605 (0.002) 
2002: 
4.283 (0.004) 1.461 (0.227) 0.060 (0.805) 
Notes: a. Financial crisis dates from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart (2010); b. Volatility equality tests 
(VET): Bartlett, Levene and Brown-Forsythe tests (p-values in brackets).  
 
 
 
  
Table 4b. Permanent and Transitory Components: Europe 
 Financial Crisis Datesa VET
b  
Bartlett Levene B-F 
European Union 
EU-12 -  - 
Austria SBC: 2008  2008: 8.05 (0.004) 1.40(0.236) 1.32 (0.250) 
Belgium SBC: 2008  2008: 13.39 (0.000) 5.31 (0.021) 6.12 (0.013) 
Denmark SBC: 2008  2008: 6.96 (0.008) 0.901 (0.342) 0.776 (0.378) 
Finland SBC: 1991; CC: 1993  1991-93: 52.31 (0.000) 29.26 (0.000) 29.56 (0.000) 
France -  -  
Germany SBC: 2007  2007: 0.020 (0.886) 0.456 (0.499) 0.209 (0.647) 
Greece CC: 1983  1983: 43.23 (0.000) 50.19 (0.000) 44.40 (0.000) 
Italy SBC: 2008; CC: 1981  
1981: 
0.955 (0.328) 5.271 (0.022) 4.133 (0.042) 
2008: 
0.272 (0.601) 0.028 (0.865) 0.444 (0.505) 
Ireland SBC: 2007  2007: 0.001 (0.967) 0.317 (0.573) 0.293 (0.588) 
Netherlands SBC: 2008  2008: 4.601 (0.031) 0.562 (0.453) 0.293 (0.588) 
Portugal CC: 1983 1983: 53.72 (0.000) 7.96 (0.005) 10.19 (0.001) 
Spain SBC: 1977, 2008; CC: 1983 
1977: 
4.183 (0.040) 2.982 (0.084) 1.763 (0.184) 
1983: 
2.36 5(0.124) 3.85 (0.050) 4.671 (0.031) 
2008: 
3.941 (0.047) 2.99 1(0.084) 5.384 (0.020) 
Sweden SBC: 1991; CC: 1993 1991-93: 20.27 (0.000) 1.072 (0.3000) 2.863 (0.091) 
United K. SBC: 2007 2007: 2.197 (0.138) 3.463 (0.063) 1.992 (0.158) 
Central and Eastern 
Czech Rep. SBC: 1996 1996: 347.78 (0.000) 168.88 (0.000) 118.80 (0.000) 
Hungary SBC: 1991, 2008 
1991: 
348.47 (0.000) 91.73 (0.000) 45.82 (0.000) 
2008: 
81.92 (0.000) 92.78 (0.000) 72.37 (0.000) 
Poland SBC: 1992; DC: 1981 
1981: 
499.69 (0.000) 186.47 (0.000) 48.75 (0.000) 
1992: 
306.27 (0.000) 58.88 (0.000) 29.62 (0.000) 
Others 
Norway SBC: 1991 1991: 6.73 (0.009) 0.027 (0.867) 0.138 (0.709) 
Russia SBC: 1998; CC: 1988; DC: 1998 1998: 372.31 (0.000) 14.26 (0.000) 3.70 (0.000) 
Switzerland - - 
Turkey 
SBC: 1982, 2000; CC: 1978, 
1984, 1991, 1996, 2001; DC: 
1978 
1978: 
0.701 (0.000) 0.028 (0.865) 0.0006 (0.980) 
1982-84: 
4.94 (0.026) 0.0006 (0.978) 0.046 (0.828) 
1991: 
22.20 (0.000) 1.68 (0.194) 0.376 (0.540) 
1996: 
22.17 (0.000) 3.72 (0.054) 1.41 (0.234) 
2000-01: 
28.35 (0.000) 6.86 (0.009) 3.93 (0.047) 
Notes: a. Financial crisis dates from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart (2010); b. Volatility equality tests (VET): Bartlett, 
Levene and Brown-Forsythe tests (p-values in brackets). 
 
  
Table 4c. Permanent and Transitory Components: Middle East and Oceania 
 Financial Crisis Datesa VET
b  
Bartlett Levene B-F 
Middle East 
Israel SBC: 1977; CC: 1975, 1980, 1985 
1975-77: 
31.71 (0.000) 9.44 (0.000) 6.94 (0.008) 
1980: 
29.30 (0.000) 8.03 (0.004) 5.28 (0.021) 
1985: 
23.18 (0.000) 6.60 (0.010) 6.80 (0.009) 
Jordan SBC: 1989; CC: 1989; DC: 1989 1989: 422.4 (0.000) 266.3 (0.000)  197.2 (0.000) 
Kuwait SBC: 1982 1982: 37.09 (0.000) 25.33 (0.000) 26.62 (0.000) 
Syria CC: 1988 1988: 30.47 (0.000) 6.98 (0.000) 3.90 (0.048) 
Saudi Arabia -  -  
Oceania 
Australia - - -  
New 
Zealand - 
 -  
Notes: a. Financial crisis dates from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart (2010); b. Volatility equality tests 
(VET): Bartlett, Levene and Brown-Forsythe tests (p-values in brackets). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4d. Permanent and Transitory Components: Asia 
 Financial Crisis Datesa VET
b  
Bartlett Levene B-F 
South 
Bangladesh SBC:  1987; CC: 1976 
1976: 
17.82 (0.000) 9.27 (0.002) 11.93 (0.000) 
1987: 
509.2 (0.000) 305.0 (0.000) 231.8 (0.000) 
India SBC: 1993 1993: 1.07 (0.300) 2.94 (0.086) 3.36 (0.067) 
Indonesia SBC: 1997; CC: 1979, 1998; DC: 1999 
1979: 
39.60 (0.000) 8.25 (0.004) 5.63 (0.018) 
1997-98-99: 
15.50 (0.000) 0.13 (0.710)  0.030 (0.862) 
Malaysia SBC: 1997; CC: 1998 1997-98: 1.95 (0.162) 8.82 (0.003) 5.54 (0.018) 
Pakistan CC: 1972 1972: 162.08 (0.000) 62.85 (0.000) 14.21 (0.000) 
Philippines SBC: 1983, 1997; CC: 1983, 1998; DC: 1983 
1983: 
28.41 (0.000) 7.50 (0.006) 3.305 (0.069) 
1997-98: 
16.78 (0.000) 2.45 (0.117) 0.610 (0.434) 
Singapore -  -  
Sri Lanka SBC: 1989; CC: 1978 
1978: 
42.54 (0.000) 83.55 (0.000) 3.24 (0.072) 
1989: 
4.57 (0.032)  0.054 (0.815) 0.024 (0.875) 
Thailand SBC: 1983, 1997; CC: 1998 
1983: 
72.36 (0.000) 45.13 (0.000) 32.08 (0.000) 
1997-1998: 
92.68 (0.000) 74.84 (0.000) 52.87 (0.000) 
North 
China SBC: 1998 1998: 305.12 (0.000) 63.46 (0.000) 33.07 (0.000) 
Hong Kong -  -  
Japan SBC: 1997 19.06 (0.000) 7.195 (0.007) 7.99 (0.004) 
Korea SBC: 1997; CC: 1998 180.66 (0.000) 73.74 (0.000) 47.20 (0.000) 
Taiwan -  -  
Notes: a. Financial crisis dates from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart (2010); b. Volatility equality tests 
(VET): Bartlett, Levene and Brown-Forsythe tests (p-values in brackets). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4e. Permanent and Transitory Components: Africa 
 Financial Crisis Datesa VET
b  
Bartlett Levene B-F 
North 
Algeria SBC: 1990; CC: 1988, 1994 
1988: 
29.90 (0.000) 24.87 (0.000) 24.26 (0.000) 
1990: 
112.15 (0.000) 68.10 (0.000) 65.09 (0.000) 
1994: 
119.74 (0.000) 66.64 (0.000) 61.37 (0.000) 
Egypt SBC: 1980; CC: 1979, 1990; DC: 1984 
1979-80: 
87.46 (0.000) 1.517 (0.218) 0.518 (0.471) 
1984: 
170.10 (0.000) 6.122 (0.013) 2.060 (0.151) 
1990: 
89.11 (0.000) 0.0002 (0.987) 0.084 (0.771) 
Morocco SBC: 1980; CC: 1981; DC: 1983 
1980-81-83: 
62.28 (0.000) 56.40 (0.000) 55.51 (0.000) 
Tunisia SBC: 1991 1991: 28.08 (0.000) 15.99 (0.000) 15.72 (0.000) 
Subshaharan 
Benin SBC: 1988; CC: 1994 
1988: 
41.87 (0.000) 41.73 (0.000) 42.87 (0.000) 
1994: 
51.12 (0.000) 32.66 (0.000) 34.41 (0.000) 
Cameroon SBC: 1987; 1995; CC: 1994; DC: 1989 
1987-89: 
62.00 (0.000) 43.11 (0.000) 44.73 (0.000) 
1994-95: 
112.3 (0.000) 47.20 (0.000) 48.45 (0.000) 
Congo 
SBC: 1983, 1991, 1994; CC: 
1976, 1983; 1989, 1994, 1999; 
DC: 1976 
1976: 
8.16 (0.004) 0.121 (0.727) 0.232 (0.629) 
1983: 
37.33 (0.000) 0.281 (0.596) 0.025 (0.872) 
1989-91: 
77.46 (0.000) 0.858 (0.354) 0.042 (0.837) 
1994: 
122.7 (0.000) 10.28 (0.001) 10.03 (0.001) 
1999: 
92.42 (0.000) 7.08 (0.008) 9.098 (0.002) 
Cote d'Ivoire SBC: 1988; CC: 1994; DC: 1984, 2001 
1984: 
105.93 (0.000) 117.28 (0.000) 65.98 (0.000) 
1988: 
90.35 (0.000) 86.17 (0.000) 50.97 (0.000) 
1994: 
51.41 (0.000) 41.13 (0.000) 24.50 (0.000) 
2001: 
14.24 (0.000) 12.83 (0.000) 7.25 (0.000) 
Ghana SBC: 1982; CC: 1978, 1983, 1993, 2000 
1978: 
134.32 (0.000) 2.48 (0.115) 0.65 (0.417) 
1982-83: 
226.74 (0.000) 4.981 (0.027) 0.780 (0.377) 
1993: 
1123.84 (0.000) 32.41 (0.000) 15.80 (0.000) 
2000: 
1003.04 (0.000) 180.5 (0.000) 8.83 (0.000) 
Kenya SBC: 1985, 1992; CC: 1993 
1985: 
1.555 (0.212) 1.920 (0.166) 1.704 (0.192) 
1992-93: 
32.55 (0.000) 19.11 (0.000) 13.89 (0.000) 
Mozambique SBC: 1987; CC: 1987; DC: 1984 
1984: 
180.32 (0.000) 57.67 (0.000) 37.10 (0.000) 
1987: 
239.69 (0.000) 78.67 (0.000) 53.04 (0.000) 
Nigeria SBC: 1991; CC: 1983, 1989, 1997; DC: 1983 
1983: 
88.81 (0.000) 56.20 (0.000) 28.38 (0.000) 
1989-91: 
0.361 (0.547) 0.010 (0.917) 0.029 (0.864) 
1997: 
158.48 (0.000) 82.20 (0.000) 46.27 (0.000) 
  
Table 4e. Permanent and Transitory Components: Africa (cont.) 
 Financial Crisis Datesa VET
b  
Bartlett Levene B-F 
Subshaharan 
Senegal SBC: 1988; CC: 1994; DC: 1981 
1981: 
40.02 (0.000) 56.13 (0.000) 52.87 (0.000) 
1988: 
48.24 (0.000) 51.73 (0.000) 50.81 (0.000) 
1994: 
19.05 (0.000) 19.06 (0.000) 21.72 (0.000) 
Sierra Leone SBC: 1990; CC: 1983; 1989; 1998; DC: 1977 
1977: 
508.95 (0.000) 24.29 (0.000) 8.79 (0.000) 
1983: 
359.24 (0.000) 39.26 (0.000) 14.08 (0.000) 
1989-90: 
28.85 (0.000) 0.0005 (0.995) 0.017 (0.894) 
1998: 
104.35 (0.000) 12.16 (0.000) 2.37 (0.123) 
South Africa CC: 1984; DC: 1985 1984-85: 94.13 (0.000) 51.55 (0.000) 36.21 (0.000) 
Tanzania SBC: 1987; CC: 1985, 1990; DC: 1984 
1984-87: 
59.76 (0.000) 15.12 (0.000) 10.51 (0.000) 
1990: 
39.67 (0.000) 8.46 (0.000) 5.53 (0.000) 
Zambia SBC: 1995; CC: 1983, 1989, 1996; DC: 1983 
1983: 
171.80 (0.000) 23.57 (0.000) 13.75 (0.000) 
1989: 
108.06 (0.000) 9.10 (0.002) 3.37 (0.067) 
1995-96: 
29.57 (0.000) 1.76 (0.184) 2.58 (0.108) 
Notes: a. Financial crisis dates from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart (2010); b. Volatility equality tests 
(VET): Bartlett, Levene and Brown-Forsythe tests (p-values in brackets).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 5a. Permanent and Transitory Components: America 
 Structural breaks in nominal 
exchange rate regimes 
VETa  
Bartlett Levene B-F 
North 
 Canada Nov 2002 66.55 (0.000) 32.72 (0.000) 28.63 (0.000) 
Mexico 
 
 
Apr 1981, Mar 1988, Dec 1994 
 
 
 
1981: 
184.51 (0.000) 
 
5.54 (0.018) 
 
3.40 (0.065) 
1988: 
236.75(0.000) 
 
3.310 (0.069) 
 
0.773 (0.000) 
1994: 
241.21 (0.000) 
 
9.69 (0.002) 
 
4.48 (0.034) 
Central 
Costa Rica Nov 1983  1983: 141.81 (0.000) 
 
85.364 (0.000) 
 
54.74 (0.000) 
El Salvador - - 
Guatemala - - 
Honduras Mar 1990,  Dec 1998 
1990: 
38.62 (0.000) 17.35 (0.000) 9.26 (0.025) 
1998: 
168.11 (0.000) 
 
51.855 (0.000) 
 
41.58 (0.000) 
Nicaragua Feb 1992 1992: 1651.4 (0.000) 
 
474.46 (0.000) 
 
120.8 (0.000) 
Panama - - 
Caribbean 
Dom. Rep. Jan 1985, Ago 1991, Jan 2005 
1985: 
92.26 (0.000) 
 
36.96 (0.000) 
 
13.59 (0.000) 
1991: 
14.082 (0.000) 
 
6.113  (0.013) 
 
1.250 (0.264) 
2005: 
63.57(0.000) 
 
13.64 (0.000) 
 
6.259 (0.012) 
Jamaica Jan 1983; Jul 1996 
1983:  
153.1 (0.000) 23.88 (0.000) 10.30 (0.001) 
1996:    
43.3(0.000)   9.62 (0.002)  4.53 (0.033) 
Trinidad T. May 1976  122.37 (0.000) 
  
 140.0 (0.000) 
 
124.13 (0.000) 
South 
Argentina Feb 1981, Mar 1991,  Oct 2001 
1981:  
164. 5 (0.00) 
 
30.17 (0.000) 
 
11.11 (0.000) 
1991: 
156.13 (0.000) 
 
49.42 (0.000) 
 
34.71 (0.000) 
2001: 
332.2 (0.000) 44.05 (0.000) 24.89 (0.000) 
Brazil - - 
Chile Jun 1976, Jan 2001 
1976:  
1876 (0.000) 271.8 (0.000) 130.7 (0.000) 
2001: 
749.7 (0.000) 
 
26.66 (0.000) 
 
9.20 (0.000) 
Colombia Jan 1994           212.6 (0.000) 
 
45.63 (0.000) 
 
28.30 (0.000) 
Ecuador Mar 1982, Apr 2001 
             1982:  
98.65 (0.000) 
 
28.25(0.000) 
 
18.05 (0.000) 
        2001: 
179.28 (0.000) 
 
47.76 (0.000) 
 
31.74 (0.000) 
Paraguay Mar 1985, Jan 1991, Mar 2002  
             1985: 
30.20 (0.000) 15.50(0.000) 10.94 (0.000) 
1991: 
0.168 (0.681) 0.069 (0.791) 0.033 (0.855) 
2002: 
0.959 (0.327) 0.177(0.673) 0.161 (0.688) 
Peru Oct 1977, Ago 1986  
1977: 
937.02 (0.000) 31.49 (0.000) 10.04 (0.000) 
1986:  
1193.7 (0.000) 
 
73.59 (0.000) 
 
23.69 (0.000) 
Uruguay - - 
Venezuela Nov 1986 508.5 (0.000) 127.7 (0.000) 82.64 (0.000) 
  
Note: a. Volatility equality tests (VET): Bartlett, Levene and Brown-Forsythe tests (p-values in brackets). 
 
Table 5b. Permanent and Transitory Components: Europe 
 Structural breaks in 
nominal exchange rate 
regimes 
VETa  
Bartlett Levene B-F 
European Union 
EU-12 Jan 1980  31.86 (0.000) 31.99 (0.000) 18.64 (0.000) 
Austria Jul 1980   83.14 (0.000) 
 
97.22 (0.000) 
 
59.28 (0.000) 
Belgium - - 
Denmark Jan 1980 86.27 (0.000) 110.80 (0.000) 62.24 (0.000) 
Finland - - 
France Mar 1979 33.81 (0.000)  34.45 (0.000)  26.55 (0.000) 
Germany - - 
Greece Jul 1981  13.23 (0.000) 19.40 (0.000) 13.41 (0.000) 
Italy - - 
Ireland Mar 1979  9.71 (0.001) 
 
2.07 (0.150) 
 
2.96 (0.085) 
Netherlands - - 
Portugal Ago 1993  34.41 (0.000) 
 
9.26 (0.005) 
 
10.38 (0.001) 
Spain - - 
Sweden - - 
United K. Sep 1992  0.986 (0.320) 
 
0.454 (0.500) 
 
0.064 (0.799) 
Central and Eastern 
Czech Rep. Ago 1981, Mar 1994 
1981: 
536.37 (0.000) 
 
190.09 (0.000) 
 
182.35 (0.000) 
1994: 
689.43 (0.000) 
 
   234.61  (0.000) 
 
177.55 (0.000) 
Hungary Jun 1979, Ago 2005 
1979: 
217.29 (0.000) 
 
34.53 (0.000) 
 
19.21 (0.000) 
2005: 
474.37 (0.000) 
 
387.58 (0.000) 
 
283.68 (0.000) 
Poland Oct 1977  848.21 (0.000) 
 
37.41 (0.000) 
 
19.38 (0.000) 
Others 
Norway SBC: 1991 1992: 1593.73 (0.000) 
 
59.01 (0.000) 
 
26.31 (0.000) 
Russia Jan 1992, Ago 1998, Ago 2005 
1998: 
372.31 (0.000) 
 
14.26 (0.000) 
 
3.70 (0.000) 
2005: 
136.94 (0.000) 
 
3.374 (0.000) 
 
0.674 (0.000) 
Switzerland - - 
Turkey - - 
Note: a. Volatility equality tests (VET): Bartlett, Levene and Brown-Forsythe tests (p-values in brackets). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 5c. Permanent and Transitory Components: Middle East and Oceania 
 Structural breaks in nominal 
exchange rate regimes 
VETa  
Bartlett Levene B-F 
Middle East 
Israel Oct 1977 1977: 31.71 (0.000) 
 
9.44 (0.000) 
 
6.94 (0.008) 
Jordan Feb 1975, Feb 1990, Ago 1995 
1975: 
14.05 (0.000) 
 
4.704 (0.000)  
 
3.212(0.000) 
1990: 
422.4 (0.000) 
 
266.33 (0.000) 
 
197.2 (0.000) 
1995: 
380.12 (0.000) 
 
212.79 (0.000) 
 
135.6 (0.000) 
Kuwait -  -  
Syria -  -  
Saudi Arabia -  -  
Oceania 
Australia Nov 1982 136.35 (0.000) 72.48 (0.000) 52.97 (0.000) 
New 
Zealand Mar 1985 
55.84 (0.000) 70.01 (0.000) 56.21 (0.000) 
Note: a. Volatility equality tests (VET): Bartlett, Levene and Brown-Forsythe tests (p-values in brackets). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 5d. Permanent and Transitory Components: Asia 
 Structural breaks in 
nominal exchange rate 
regimes 
VETa  
Bartlett Levene B-F 
South 
Bangladesh - - 
India Jul 1979, Dec 2004 
1979: 
42.77 (0.000) 
 
9.232 (0.002) 
 
6.183 (0.013) 
2004: 
15.27 (0.000) 
 
4.180 (0.000) 
 
2.031 (0.000) 
Indonesia Jul 1997  15.50 (0.000) 0.13 (0.710)  0.030 (0.862) 
Malaysia Jul 1998  1.95 (0.162) 8.82 (0.003) 5.54 (0.018) 
Pakistan Jun 1982  378.42 (0.000) 
 
84.64 (0.000) 
 
42.75 (0.000) 
Philippines Jul 1997  16.78 (0.000) 
 
2.45 (0.117) 
 
0.610 (0.434) 
Singapore -  -  
Sri Lanka Nov 1981, Sep 1989 
1981: 
31.81 (0.000) 
 
5.919 (0.015) 
 
2.237 (0.135) 
1989: 
4.57 (0.032)  0.054 (0.815) 0.024 (0.875) 
Thailand Jul 1997  92.68 (0.000) 
 
74.84 (0.000) 
 
52.87 (0.000) 
North 
China Jan 1994  183.63 (0.000) 
 
46.43 (0.000) 
 
25.35 (0.000) 
Hong Kong Oct 1983  123.90 (0.000)   
 
73.80(0.000) 
 
49.24 (0.000) 
Japan Nov 1977 0.747 (0.000) 0.947 (0.330) 1.315 (0.251) 
Korea Nov 1997 180.66 (0.000) 73.74 (0.000) 47.20 (0.000) 
Taiwan -  -  
Note: a. Volatility equality tests (VET): Bartlett, Levene and Brown-Forsythe tests (p-values in brackets). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 5e. Permanent and Transitory Components: Africa 
 Structural Breaks in 
nominal exchange rate 
regimes 
VETa  
Bartlett Levene B-F 
North 
Algeria Mar 1994  119.74 (0.000) 
 
66.64 (0.000) 
 
61.37 (0.000) 
Egypt Oct 1991  89.11 (0.000) 
 
0.0002 (0.987) 
 
0.084 (0.771) 
Morocco - - 
Tunisia - - 
Subshaharan 
Benin - - 
Cameroon Dec 1994  112.3 (0.000) 
 
47.20 (0.000) 
 
48.45 (0.000) 
Congo Mar 1976  8.16 (0.004) 
 
0.121 (0.727) 
 
0.232 (0.629) 
Cote d'Ivoire - - 
Ghana Sep 1987  1493 (0.000) 
 
54.12 (0.000) 
 
26.06  (0.000) 
Kenya Dec 1978  56.02 (0.000) 
 
19.55 (0.000) 
 
12.26  (0.000) 
Mozambique - - 
Nigeria Sep 1984, Mar 1996  
1984: 
71.19 (0.000) 
 
48.28 (0.000) 
 
23.85 (0.000) 
1996: 
179.47 (0.000) 
 
95.41 (0.000) 
 
53.86 (0.000) 
Subshaharan 
Senegal Nov 1994  19.05 (0.000) 
 
19.06 (0.000) 
 
21.72 (0.000) 
Sierra Leone - - 
South Africa Jan 1979  81.74 (0.000) 
 
46.82 (0.000) 
 
30.35 (0.000) 
Tanzania Jan 1979  5.198 (0.000) 
 
0.079 (0.000) 
 
0.417 (0.518) 
Zambia Jul 1976, Jul1983 
1976: 
212.37 (0.000) 21.87 (0.000) 14.01 (0.000) 
1983: 
171.80 (0.000) 
 
23.57 (0.000) 
 
13.75 (0.000) 
Notes: a.Volatility equality tests (VET): Bartlett, Levene and Brown-Forsythe tests (p-values in brackets).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
